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 MONTAIGNE,  LEAR,   
AN D TH E QUESTION OF AFTERLIFE 
George HOFFMANN 
Holding his dead daughter, old Lear suddenly believes he sees something given to none of this life to behold; 
“Look, her lips, / Look there, look there,” he vainly bids the other players, as Cordelia’s soul, heaven bound, 
issues from her limp body. In making these a dying madman’s words, however, Shakespeare invites his 
audience to consider rather the fact that we see nothing, and thus to reflect upon the gaping void that seems to 
lie between Christian promises of salvation and the play’s depiction of a bleak, inhospitable universe. Thirty 
years earlier, Montaigne staged this same scene, to much the same effect, in his essay “Of exercise,” casting 
himself not only in the roles of both Lear and Cordelia, but also in that of the duly skeptical spectator. This 
paper seeks to situate these two ambiguous stagings of the Christian “death” in a wider social context of 
popular anxiety about salvation and native skepticism over the immortality of the soul. It argues that Montaigne 
purposely evokes a tradition of heterodoxical responses to the problem of death beginning with the second 
chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon and stretching to Anabaptism. Instead of a Christian afterlife, Montaigne 
intimates that his spirit will live on not in his resurrected body but in a mummy, “I expose myself entire: my 
portrait is a cadaver on which the veins, the muscles, and the tendons appear at a glance (Frame, 274), the 
mummy, then, of his book, tightly bound in dried pigskin. 
Montaigne, Lear et le problème de la vie éternelle Tenant le corps de sa fille morte, le vieux Lear croit tout 
d’un coup s’apercevoir de ce qu’aucun de ce monde ne peut contempler ; « Regarde, ses lèvres, / Regarde là, 
regarde là », prie-t-il en vain les autres interprètes pendant que l’âme de Cordelia abandonne son corps 
inanimé pour le ciel. Mais en rapportant ceci à travers la parole d’un homme déséquilibré et mourrant lui-même, 
Shakespeare invite son public à réfléchir plutôt sur le fait que nous ne voyons rien, et sur l’abîme qui sépare les 
promesses du salut chrétien d’une part, et de l’autre, l’image d’un univers inhospitalier dépeint tout au long de 
la pièce. Trois décennies auparavant, Montaigne mettait ce même dispositif en scène dans son essai « De 
l’exercitation » jouant non seulement les rôles de Lear et de Cordelia, mais aussi celui du spectateur dûment 
sceptique. Cette communication cherche à placer ces deux mises en scène ambiguës de la « belle mort » 
chrétienne dans un contexte plus large de l’inquiétude populaire sur le salut et du scepticisme autochtone sur 
l’immortalité de l’âme. Nous proposons que Montaigne évoque délibérément une tradition de réponses 
hétérodoxes au problème de la mort, allant du deuxième chapitre de la Sagesse de Salomon jusqu’à 
l’anabaptisme contemporain. Au lieu de l’au-delà chrétien, Montaigne suggère que son esprit perdurera non 
pas dans son corps ressuscité mais dans la momie de son livre, relié en vélin et où « Je m’estalle entier : c’est 
un Skeletos où, d’une veuë, les veines, les muscles, les tendons paroissent » (II, 6, 379c). 
As virtuous m en pass m ildly  aw ay, 
And w hisper to their souls to go, 
W hilst som e of their sad friends do say , 
“The breath goes now ,” and som e say  “No”… 
J ohn Donne 
olding his dead daughter at the end of King Lear, the self-
deposed king and broken-hearted father suddenly believes he 
sees something given to none of this life to behold; “Look, her 
lips, /  Look there, look there,” he vainly bids the other players. On the 
strength of the earlier lines, “Lend me a looking-glass /  If that her 
breath will mist or stain the stone” (V.iii.235-6), most critics 
H 
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understand Lear’s attention to her lips as the vain hope to find her 
breathing resuscitated. Yet, moments later, Edgar will bid the 
unconscious Lear, “Look up, my lord,” to which Kent responds “Vex 
not his ghost, O let him pass” (287-8); the second exchange suggests 
that what Lear desired to see was rather Cordelia’s soul issuing from 
her limp body, heaven bound. In expressing this hope through a dying 
madman’s words, however, Shakespeare invites his audience to 
consider rather the fact that w e see nothing, and thus to reflect upon 
the void that separates Christian promises of salvation from the play’s 
depiction of a bleak, inhospitable universe.241 Thirty years earlier, 
Montaigne staged this same scene, to much the same effect, in his essay 
“Of exercise,” casting himself not only in the roles of both Lear and 
Cordelia, but also in that of the duly skeptical spectator. 
The essayist suffered hemorrhaging and a severe concussion 
after being knocked from his horse in  the late 1560s. Wavering on the 
brink of death, he calls his reader’s attention to his lips, as Lear would 
do to Cordelia’s, Il m e sem bloit que m a vie ne m e tenoit plus qu’au 
bout des lèvres: je ferm ois les yeux pour ayder, ce m e sem bloit, à la 
pousser hors, “It seemed to me that my life was hanging only by the tip 
of my lips; I closed my eyes in order, it seemed to me, to help push it 
out” (II, 6, 72; 374a; 269).242 Here, invoking the hallowed formulae of a 
traditional Christian death, Montaigne stages Lear’s vision of the 
eternal soul taking leave of its mortal trappings. Or Lear’s delusion, 
more precisely, for after attenuating this impression through the 
repeated “seem,” he immediately judges this intimation of immortality 
a mere illusion. Frame translates Montaigne’s “imagination” as “idea,” 
but the rest of the sentence makes clear that this is but a figment qui ne 
faisoit que nager superficiellem ent en m on am e, aussi tendre et aussi 
foible que tout le reste, “that was only floating on the surface of my 
                                                 
241
 Despite the impressive erudition that Elton mobilizes to scrutinize religious attitudes in 
Lear, he remains curiously reticent regarding these lines, acknowledging only in a note that 
they might allude to the tradition of the soul passing through the mouth, and preferring the 
simpler reading by which the “illusion” Lear experiences is merely the one that Cordelia 
might still be breathing, 258, n. 210, and 334. I thank Debbie Losse and François Rigolot 
for allowing me to present this at the annual Renaissance Society of America’s conference in 
2002, as well as Philippe Desan for inviting me to present this at the University of Chicago 
that same year, and I am grateful to him and all those present, including Peter Dembowski, 
Larry Norman and Thomas Pavel, for their helpful suggestions. Finally, I thank Warren 
Boutcher for his kind support. 
242
 References are to the Tournon edition, followed by the Villey-Saulnier one, and then 
Donald Frame’s translation. 
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soul, as delicate and feeble as all the rest” (II, 6, 72; 374a; 269-70). The 
departure of his eternal soul is but an idea to which he pays lip service, 
seulem ent en la bouche, according to the popular expression of the 
time.243 
To my knowledge, André Tournon was the first to call attention 
to these lines, but modern preoccupations have continued to lead most 
readers away from their religious implications (138-41). For example, 
Louis Marin quotes the sentence in a perceptive article on the essay’s 
“unutterable cogito of death.” That formula is finely put, but 
Montaigne’s notation on the “sweet feeling” of letting go lures Marin 
into reflecting on the death-wish and Thanatos impulse rather than the 
author’s pointed obliviousness to the hope of eternal life (50). Yet from 
the start, Montaigne has maneuvered to place these comments in a 
quintessentially religious perspective, launching the essay with the 
anecdote of Canius J ulius waiting calmly at his execution to discern 
quelque deslogem ent de l’am e, “any dislodgment of the soul” (II, 6, 68; 
371a; 267). That phrase, absent in Seneca’s De tranquilitate anim i, 
imparts a distinctly Christian inflection to Canius’ philosophical desire 
to learn quis esset anim arum  status, “what the state of the soul really 
is” (XIV, 9, 271). Montaigne seems to displace the question begged by 
his near-fatal accident onto Seneca’s Canius who promises Vos 
quaeritis an im m ortales anim ae sint; ego iam  sciam , “You are 
wondering whether souls are immortal, but I shall soon know.” How 
could Montaigne not have recalled the famous chorus, post m ortem  
nihil est ipsaque m ors nihil […] m ors individua est, noxia corpori /  
nec parcens anim ae, “There is nothing after death and death itself is 
nothing […] Death is something that admits no cleavage, destructive to 
the body and unsparing of the soul,” from Seneca’s Troades (1: 156-7, 
lines 397, 401-2; Montaigne quotes the end of this speech, I, 3, 67; 21c; 
13)? Of the many who had sought to act as dispassionate observers of 
their own expiration, Montaigne laconically comments, ils ne sont pas 
revenues nous en dire les nouvelles, “they have not come back to tell us 
news of it.” Qualifying these ancients’ findings (or lack thereof) as 
“news” once again frames the discussion in a decidedly Christian 
context, namely that of the one person from past times who notably did 
                                                 
243
 Cf. Il m ’interrom pit pour m e prier d’en user ainsi, et de m onstrer par effect que les 
discours que nous avions tenus ensem ble pendant nostre santé, nous ne les portions pas 
seulem ent en la bouche, m ais engravez bien avant au cueur et en l’am e, Montaigne, “Lettre 
sur la mort de La Boétie,” Œuvres com plètes, ed. Thibaudet and Rat, 1353. 
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return to bring the “Good News” of everlasting life, but about whom 
Montaigne, seemingly deliberately, remains silent.244 
Such silence seems all the more striking in that his “they have 
not come back to tell us news of it” recalled a passage that served as a 
lightening rod in Renaissance debates over the immortality of the soul. 
The second chapter of the apocryphal W isdom  of Solom on , still 
considered canonical at the time, relates the reasoning of unbelievers: 
no one has been known to return from the dead. Because we were born 
by mere chance, and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been; 
because the breath in our nostrils is smoke, and reason is a spark 
kindled by the beating of our hearts. When it is extinguished, the body 
will turn to ashes, and the spirit will dissolve like empty air […] our life 
will pass away like the traces of a cloud and be scattered like mist that is 
chased by the rays of the sun […] Come, therefore, let us enjoy the good 
things that exist (2.1-6).245 
The memorable simile, “our life will pass away like the traces of a 
cloud,” finds a faint echo in Montaigne’s c’estoyent des pensem ens 
vains, en nuë, “these were idle thoughts, in the clouds” (II, 6, 76; 376a; 
271). His description of his failing faculties reverberates with the 
depiction of the dying soul dissolving “like empty air”: ce que l’am e y  
prestoit, c’estoyent en songe, touchée bien legierem ent, et com m e 
lechée seulem ent et arrosée par la m olle im pression des sens, “what 
the soul contributed was in a dream, touched very lightly, and merely 
licked and sprinkled, as it were, by the soft impression of the senses” 
(II, 6, 76-7; 376a; 272). François Garasse called the book of W isdom , 
after Pomponazzi, Paracelsus, and Machiavelli, la quadrature du cercle 
des atheistes, “the squaring of the atheist’s circle” (1013); in  particular, 
Pomponazzi’s writings on the identical nature of the soul and the body 
recall Montaigne’s marked insistence in this essay that the two go hand 
in hand: et l’am e et le corps enseveli et endorm y , “soul and body were 
                                                 
244
 See Legros, however, on exaggerations of J esus’s absence from the Essays. 
245
 Apologists made frequent reference to this passage, and often quoted or paraphrased 
extensively from it. For example, Extinctus cinis erit corpus nostrum , et spiritus effundetur 
tanquam  m alis aër, transibit vita nostra tanquam  vestigium  nubis, ex nihilo nati sum us, 
et post hoc erim us tanquam  non fuerim us, qui fuim us afflatus est in narribus nostris, et 
serm o scintillæ ad com m ovendum  cor nostrum , etc. Crespet 224v; Les m eschans ont dit en 
eux-m esm es, Le tem ps de nostre vie est bref, & avec ennuy , & n’est aucun qui soit conu 
estre retourné des m orts, car nous som m es nais de rien, & apres ce nous serons com e si 
nous n’eussions point esté. Car nostre corps sera cendre esteinte, & l’esprit sera espars 
com m e le m ol air, & nostre nom  sera oublié avec le tem ps, La Noue 21; see, also, La 
Primaudaye 289 r, 1615 ed.: 336-7; and Du Pont [Le Heurte] 7r. 
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buried in sleep,” and Quand aux functions de l’am e, elles naissoient 
avec m esm e progrez que celles du corps, “As for the functions of the 
soul, they were reviving with the same progress as those of the body” 
(II, 6, 72; 374a; 269-70). Indeed, his memory of the impact only returns 
once his body can sense pain again. La Primaudaye rehearsed a 
common conception of the pair’s connection, Le corps et l’am e sont de 
nature tellem ent liez et conjoincts encem ble, qu’il n’y  a que la m ort 
ravissant tout […] qui les puisse separer, “the body and soul are so 
linked and joined by nature that only death, which ravishes everything 
[…] can divide them” (5).246 Yet, it is precisely in the proximity of 
death, when the two should loosen their bond, that Montaigne insists 
his body and soul’s fates remain more entwined than ever. 
Montaigne’s essay might have sounded a number of other 
distinctly heterodoxical notes to sixteenth-century ears. First would 
come the blatant contradiction with his own promotion of the Spanish 
theologian, Raymond Sebon. Sebon had founded his argument against 
the grand nom bre de personnes qui jugent leur am e n’estre rien sans 
le corps, et qui m esurent son vivre et sa duree à la vie, et au durer de 
leurs m em bres, “great many people who judge their soul to be nothing 
without the body, and who measure its longevity by their lives and the 
longevity of their limbs,” precisely upon the prolongation of mental 
operations, particularly the acts of willing and desiring, as the body 
declined. In fact, these faculties, in Montaigne’s translation of Sebon, 
se fortifient et augm entent, “fortify and augment themselves,” when 
facing imminent death (Œuvres com plètes, ed. Armaingaud 10 : 49, 51-
2). His essay, on the contrary, denies that à un si grand estonnem ent 
de m em bres et si grande défaillance des sens, l’am e peut m aintenir 
aucune force au dedans pour se reconnoistre, “with… so great a failing 
of the senses, the soul could maintain any force within by which to be 
conscious of itself” (II, 6, 74; 375a; 270).  
Against the background of religious debate in his time, 
Montaigne’s argument that the dying avoient et l’am e et le corps 
enseveli et endorm i, “their soul and body were buried in sleep” (II, 6, 
73; 374a; 270) would have called to mind the controversial belief, 
attributed variously to Anabaptists, Catabaptists, and 
Psychopannychists, that the soul fell asleep at death. The Council of 
                                                 
246
 Or: Nam  nec anim a per se est hom o, nec corpus est hom o, sed una am bo honm o sunt 
(Postel 9), quoted by Febvre, 209, trans. 197-8. 
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Florence in 1439 and the Fifth Lateran Council in 1513 (session 8) both 
explicitly condemned this doctrine, maintaining that the soul remained 
awake and conscious through and after death. Calvin, notably, 
inaugurated his theological career in attacking the heresy of 
psychosomnolence; and he would go on to affirm that at the moment of 
death souls sentent et cognoissent, “feel and know” (3: 377-451, trans. 
125) whereas Montaigne argues at length exactly the opposite, la 
foiblesse de m on discours m e gardoit d’en rien juger, et celle du corps 
d’en rien sentir, “the weakness of my understanding kept me from 
having any judgment of it, and that of my body of having any feeling of 
it” (II, 6, 77; 377a; 272).247 The essayist repeatedly draws an analogy 
between death and a sort of cerebral som m eil: Il sem ble que cette 
consideration deut partir d’une am e esveillée, si est-ce que je n’y  estois 
aucunem ent, “It would seem that this consideration must have 
proceeded from a wide-awake soul; yet the fact is that I was not there 
at all” (77; 377a; 271), les douleurs que le pied ou la m ain sentent 
pendant que nous dorm ons, ne sont pas à nous, “the pains which the 
foot or the hand feel while we are asleep are not ours” (76; 376a; 271); 
and he compares his approach to death, with the sibilant assonances of 
soft snoring, to those qui se laissent glisser au som m eil, “who let 
themselves slide into sleep” (73; 374a; 270). Elsewhere, he speaks of 
his fainting as containing an element of pleasure, com m e d’un passage 
au som m eil et au repos, “as when we pass into sleep and rest” (II, 13, 
447; 610a; 462) and, memorably, of death, je m e plonge la teste 
baissée, stupidem ent, dans la m ort, sans la considerer et recognoistre, 
com m e dans une profondeur m uette et obscure, qui m ’englouitit d’un 
saut et accable en un instant d’un puissant som m eil, plein d’insipidité 
et d’indolence, “I plunge head down, stupidly, into death, without 
looking at it and recognizing it, as into a silent and dark abyss which 
swallows me up at one leap and overwhelms me in an instant with a 
heavy sleep free from feeling and pain” (III, 9, 287; 971b; 742). 
Comparing death to sleep counted as a classical commonplace, 
but Montaigne foregoes the opportunity to argue for the survival of the 
soul by analogy to the sleeper’s mind which dreams even as the body 
rests. Instead, in sleep, nous perdons la connoissance de la lum iere et 
de nous! […] la faculté du som m eil qui nous prive de toute action et de 
                                                 
247
 Farley translates "are alive and conscious"; I have adopted a more literal translation to 
maintain the similarity between the French texts. 
  MONTAIGNE, LEAR, AND THE QUESTION OF AFTERLIFE 161 
tout sentim ent, “we lose consciousness of the light and of ourselves […] 
deprives us of all action and all feeling”: this is the l’eternel estat, 
“eternal state” that awaits humankind (II, 6, 69; 372a; 268). Montaigne 
seems to return the common Christian metaphor of death as a spiritual 
“rest” to its literal origin, the loss of consciousness that occurs in sleep. 
Calvin concluded that it is “offensive to human intelligence and the 
Christian faith to hold that souls are put to sleep at the very time they 
are closest to God in order to be more perfectly conscious of His 
goodness, all Christendom has viewed such a fantasy with horror […] 
‘sleep’ does not belong to the soul but ought to be attributed entirely to 
the body” (141, 144). In fact, death was precisely the time at which the 
soul should be most alert, as reminded J acques Davy du Perron’s 
Funeral Oration for Ronsard , in which the poet excitoit [son âm e] 
courageusem ent à se préparer à ce bienheureux departm ent 
[…dem andant] si elle vouloit dorm ir alors qu’il estoit tem ps de songer 
à desloger, et si elle vouloit dem eurer engourdie en cette m asse 
corporelle, “courageously exhorted [his soul] to prepare itself for this 
blessed separation […asking] if it wanted to sleep when it was time to 
think about dislodging, and if it wanted to remain asleep in this bodily 
mass” (94, ed. Simonin 123). 
Of course, Augustine speaks of “total death” when the soul dies 
as well as the body (De civitate Dei, 13: 2, 12; 20 : 26; 22: 30 ; cf. 
Febvre’s (tendentious) reading of this idea, 180-4), but he intends this 
on a figurative level and in an intention that hardly places Montaigne 
in a more flattering light: the soul “dies” when it is forsaken by God, 
signaling its future damnation: Irenaeus and Arnobius similarly 
claimed a damned man’s soul “died” through perdition. In Montaigne’s 
time, Pierre Crespet, following Lactantius (Divinæ Institutiones, 7: 5, 
8-13; PL, 6: 749, 761-79), discussed another sense in which the soul 
could be said to die: elle ne perd pas le sentim ent, “it does not loose 
feeling,” however, since l’am e pendant qu’elle est detenuë par les liens 
corporels, qui sont les passions corruptibles, elle cede aux douleurs 
m ortelles, m ais après qu’elle sera separée du corps qui va à sa 
corruption, elle est portée au ciel, où jam ais elle n’envieillit, “the soul, 
while still held by bodily bonds, which are the corruptible passions, 
yields to mortal agony, but after it has left the body which passes into 
decomposition, it is lifted to heaven, where it never grows old” (216v, 
224r). So, the soul feels the pain of death, is thrown into a state of 
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shock, and yet is not destroyed by it; once again, Montaigne specifically 
resists this solution insofar as his main argument attempts to show that 
the soul does not feel any pain in dying. 
In sum, Montaigne’s essay begins to read as a gloss on two lines 
from Lucretius which he quotes in the Apologie, Corpoream  naturam  
anim i esse necesse est, /  Corporeis quoiniam  telis ictuque laborat, 
“The soul must be of a corporeal nature for it is affected by the 
opposition and shocks of bodily objects” (De rerum  natura 3.176; II, 12, 
349; 550b; 412). He seems to have realized the implications of this as 
early as his 1564 reading of De rerum  natura, when he writes on one of 
the flyleaves anim us et anim a m oralis sic…, “The anim us and the 
anim a are mortal. Thus…”, letting the consequence trail off in an 
unfinished note, but not necessarily uncompleted thought (Screech 
123). Certainly, Lucretius had taught him nothing if not that the body 
and soul are inseparable, and he notes in his reading the extrem e 
conjunction  of the two, inseparablem ent joints, and again, in Latin, 
Coniunctissim a sunt corpus et anim a ergo eiusdem  naturæ , “the body 
and soul are completely joined and thus of the same nature” (302, 311, 
125); the idea reappears in the Essais as l’estroicte cousture de l’esprit 
et du corps, “the narrow seam between the soul and the body” (I, 21, 
191; 104a; 74).  
In 1584, Antoine de Laval still shuddered with horror at the 
memory of hearing an unnamed free thinker in the company of 
plusieurs de nos jeunes Princes soustenir que l’am e et le sang estoit la 
m esm e chose, que l’estre et duree de l’un perissoit quant à l’autre, et 
tous deux ensem ble, “several of our young princes maintain that he 
soul and blood were the same, and the existence and longevity of one 
expired with the other, and both together.” Laval claims to have piped 
up that one’s eye in the dark nonetheless retains the faculty of sight; 
Tout à coup s’en esleve un autre plus cresté, qui croyoit avoir m eilleur 
droict en sa Question. Si l’am e subsistoit sans le corps, elle agiroit 
sans ses organes. Or n’agit elle jam ais sans eux, voire m esm e en ce qui 
est de sa principalle fonction qui est d’entendre: car quand elle 
entend, (Arist. lib.3.de anim a.) elle se sert de la phantasie, la 
phantasie de la form e du phantosm e ou figure du corps im aginé, donc 
elle ne peut estre sans corps, “Suddenly there arose one more bold, 
who thought to have the better in the question. If the soul lived on after 
the body, it would have to act without its organs. Now, it never acts 
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apart from them, even in its principal function which is to 
comprehend: for when it comprehends (Aristotle, De anim a, III) it uses 
the faculty of phantasia, the image of the form of the outline or figure 
of the imagined body, thus it cannot act without [the] body” (388 r; cf. 
Foix’s arguments against this same position, 373-4). Nor is Laval’s 
claim uncorroborated: in 1571, Constatino Tessera was accused in 
Venice of claiming that l’anim a nostra non e altro ch’il sangue nostro, 
“our soul is nothing other than our blood” (Davidson 65). Interestingly, 
in the margin of his copy of the 1595 Essais, beside Montaigne’s Une 
am e si rare et exam plaire ne coute elle non plus à tuer qu’une am e 
populaire et inutile? “Does a soul so rare and exemplary cost no more 
to kill than a plebian and useless one?” this same Laval marked tuer 
une am e est une estrange façon de parler, “killing a soul is a strange 
way to speak” (II, 13, 440 ; 606c; 458; 1595 ed.: 400 ; see Simonin, 
“Antoine de Laval” and Hoffmann, “Croiser le fer”). Elsewhere, he 
would not mince words, and when Montaigne observed that no 
Christian was unbiased enough to stand as a fit judge of religious 
quarrels of his day, Laval noted acidly, Cela ne se dict que par les 
Athées, “only atheists say this sort of thing” (II, 12, 432; 600a; 454; 
1595 ed.: 397). 
Montaigne would seem to tempt censorious readers like Laval 
by his description of the blow that struck him unconscious as le 
foudroier, “hit us like a thunderbolt” (II, 6, 71; 373a; 269), for Christian 
apologists typically threatened that atheists who refused to believe in 
immortality would be struck down by lightning.248 Even Montaigne’s 
only reference to the autre m onde proves highly ambiguous, il m e 
sem bla que c’estoit un esclair qui m e frapoit l’am e de secousse et que je 
revenoy  de l’autre m onde, “It seemed to me that a flash of lightning 
was striking my soul with a violent shock, and that I was coming back 
from the other world” (II, 6, 78; 377a; 272). Despite appearances, he is 
not talking about the accident itself, but rather his sudden recollection 
of the moment of impact the next day; according to the logic of the 
passage, then, the “other world” from which he returns can only be the 
never-never land of amnesia.  
Would Montaigne, then, count as an atheist? Although he 
underwent what he calls the approches, “approaches” of death (II, 6, 
70 ; 372a; 268), he did not die. The fall from his horse constitutes but 
                                                 
248
 Willett, however, finds in this a reference to Paul’s conversion in Acts. 
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an analogy to, and not a direct experience of, a state that can only be 
approximated asymptotically—since, according to him, it entails a loss 
of the very consciousness by which one could apprehend it. “M’est-il 
permis de parler de ma mort? Que veut dire ce syntagme ‘ma mort’?” as 
Derrida has written (48), describing death in terms of a imponderable 
limit of human knowledge and truth. It is an old idea: “so long as we 
exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist” 
wrote Epicurus to Meneceus (Montaigne: Elle [la m ort] ne vous 
concerne ny  m ort ny  vif: vif, parce que vous estes: m ort, par ce que 
vous n’estes plus, “It does not concern you dead or alive; alive because 
you are; dead because you are no more” I, 20 , 176; 95c; 66); Lucretius 
repeated, “We shall not feel, because we shall not be.” “Death is not 
lived through,” concluded Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Montaigne 
does not claim to dispel fear of the unknown by making it known, or 
knowable, through any familiarity he has personally attained with it; 
death remains not only unknown for him, it is inherently unknowable. 
Quoting Epicurus, he repeats approvingly, Il est im possible d’establir 
quelque chose de certain de l’im m ortelle nature par la m ortelle, “it is 
impossible to establish anything certain about immoral nature from 
mortal nature” (II, 12, 300; 520c; 386). In death, there are no experts, 
“the one experience I shall never describe,” confessed Virginia Wolf. 
Unlike his patron saint, the archangel Michael, who was supposed to 
have offered succor to the soul at the instant of its departure from the 
body and was accompanied by the image of a balance, symbol of the 
Last J udgment (Delumeau, Rassurer et protéger 321-2), Montaigne 
adopts the emblem of the balance to signify, rather, the suspension of 
judgment in accord with the famous accompanying motto, Que sais-je? 
The comfort Montaigne derives from his experience is minimal 
when compared to that sought by his Christian and classical 
predecessors: whatever it is, death does not hurt (much) –  rather like 
the quip by Woody Allen, “I’m not afraid to die. I just don’t want to be 
there when it happens.” At the same time, Montaigne’s insistence on 
the plaisir, “pleasure” (II, 6, 72; 374a; 269) of letting oneself go 
militates against stoic and Christian versions of a patiently suffered 
“heroic” death (Delumeau, Le Catholicism e 97-102, trans. 43-7). 
Walter Raleigh, accused in his day as an atheist, also could question the 
soul’s immortality in attacking clerics, yet fervently affirm it in 
criticizing secular society, thereby illustrating a “discontent hovering 
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between faith and skepticism” (Greenblatt 101-2). Today, as well, polls 
show that half of all those who assent to the existence of God still 
cannot bring themselves to believe in their own existence after death 
(Vergote 60-1). 
In a scene remarkably similar to Montaigne’s essay, Brantôme 
relates how a chamber maid remained transfixed at the side of the 
dying Marguerite de Navarre. Afterwards, she explained that  
ayant ouy  tant discourir à tant de sçavans docteurs que l’am e et 
l’esprit sortoyent du corps aussi tost ainsi qu’il trespassoit, elle vouloit 
veoir s’il en sentiroit quelque vent ou bruit, ou le m oindre resonnem ent 
du m onde, au desloger et sortir, m ais qu’elle n’y  avoit rien aperceu  
(182-3)  
having heard so many learned doctors discourse at such length on the 
soul and spirit leaving the body at the moment of death, that she wanted 
to see if one could make out any wind or sound, or the least little 
reverberation, at the issue and dislodgm ent, but that she had perceived 
nothing (emphasis mine). 
Those doctors had compared the swan’s dying song to the soul’s 
departure, and so, she repeated, she vouloit veoir sortir ou sentir 
resonner et ouyr ceste am e ou celluy  esprit, ce qu’il feroit à son 
déloger, “wanted to see leave or feel reverberate or hear that soul or 
that spirit, what it would do at its dislodgem ent.” The disappointed girl 
confessed that she now did not know what to think of the eternity of 
the soul, but, she prudently hastened to reassure the gathered 
company, elle vouloit croire en ce que son Dieu et son Eglise 
com m andoient, sans entrer plus avant en autre curiosité, “she wanted 
to believe in what her God and her Church commanded, without 
pushing the limits of curiosity any farther.” 
Brantôme’s indirect swipe at Marguerite’s piety resembles the 
manner in which Montaigne and Shakespeare encourage a skeptical 
response to resurrection without crossing the line of what their 
“Church commanded.” J ust as Montaigne has prepared the reader to 
examine dubiously his account through his earlier relation of Canius 
J ulius’s futile attempt to bring back “news” of his death, so, too, has 
Shakespeare primed his audience to scrutinize with distrust Lear’s 
claim to see Cordelia’s soul through the earlier, ludicrous scene of 
Gloucester’s purported salvation on the cliffs of Dover. Edgar evokes a 
divine perspective, echoing the question of divine Providence raised by 
Gloucester’s earlier “As flies to wonton boys are we to th’ gods: /  They 
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kill us for their sport” (IV.i.37-8): “The crows and choughs that wing the 
midway air /  Show scarce so gross as beetles […] The fishermen that 
walk upon the beach /  Appear like mice, and yon tall anchoring barque 
/  Diminished to her cock, her cock a buoy /  Almost too small for sight” 
(IV.v.13-14, 17-20). Gloucester jumps, thinking to kill himself and 
merely falls. Now reversing the optical perspective, Edgar invites his 
father to consider a gigantic demon who would have tormented him 
back on the cliff, “As I stood here below, methoughts his eyes /  Were 
two full moons. He had a thousand noses, /  Horns whelked and waved 
like the enraged sea. /  It was some fiend. therefore, thou happy father, 
/  Think that the clearest gods, who make them honors /  Of men’s 
impossibilities, have preserved thee” (IV.v.68-74). 
Gloucester has literally become a plaything of the gods, save 
that “divine” intervention amounts to no more than Edgar’s playacting. 
Gloucester is a fly to cruel boys, or, rather, to his own cruel boy, for 
Edgar, in refusing to reveal himself and thus toying with his father, is 
indeed cruel; as Auden famously remarked, “About Edgar hangs the 
shadow of impure motive. Those to whom evil is done do evil in turn.” 
The imagination of a providential salvation assumes the measure of 
Gouchester’s blindness, a man mocked from the start of the play for his 
superstitious credulity. God’s omniscient vision is but a trick of 
distance. Hence a certain gratuitousness in Lear and Cordelia’s deaths 
that Bradley pointed toward long ago (252-3). In each case—the blind 
Gloucester, the dying Lear, and the addled Montaigne—, we are put 
before characters who think that they have witnessed a redemption, 
and in each case we are invited to distrust the account given of 
salvation. 
Though one would have expected the administration of last rites 
to have been the most pressing concern for all present at Montaigne’s 
accident, they are conspicuously missing in his relation, although in 
best contrarian fashion, he claims elsewhere that he does ask for them 
when they are not needed, Tout au com m encem ent de m es fiévres et 
des m aladies qui m ’atterent, entier encores et voisin de la santé, je m e 
reconcilie à Dieu par les derniers offices Chrestiens, et m ’en trouve 
plus libre et deschargé, “At the very beginning of my fevers and the 
maladies that lay me low, while still whole and in the neighborhood of 
health, I reconcile myself with God by the last Christian offices, and 
find myself thereby more free and unburdened” (III, 9, 304; 982b; 751). 
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In the letter on La Boétie’s death, closely related to this chapter, as 
François Rigolot demonstrated long ago, last rites are barely evoked; 
after duly making a profession of his faith, La Boétie bids the priest 
farewell, saving his last words for Montaigne’s ears. Absent as well, 
despite all of La Boétie’s loquaciousness, is the traditional bedside 
com m endatio anim æ , “Deliver me, O Lord, from eternal death,” and 
nowhere, despite his protestations of obedience to the Church, does 
one find the penitential formulae urged by devotional authorities. Far 
from appearing a Christian Antidote à la m ort, “antidote to death” 
(Matthieu, 122 [3.3.1062-3]), and despite La Boétie’s own political 
defense of the sacrament of extreme unction (Mém oire 1: 131-2), the 
Eucharist maintains a low profile, as Philippe Desan has pointed out. 
Montaigne’s family and friends saw to it that his own death did 
not suffer such embarrassing oversights, and they worked in concert to 
situate his demise, nearly a quarter century after his fall from his horse, 
within an explicitly orthodox framework. Marie de Gournay insisted in 
her preface to the posthumous 1595 edition, against Ceux qui 
pretendent calom nier sa religion  that tout ainsi que jam ais hom m e ne 
voulut plus de m al aux nulles et faulces religions que luy , de m esm e il 
n’en fut oncques un plus ennem y  de tout ce qui blessoit le respect de la 
vraye (33-4). More emphatic still was the Greek inscription that his 
wife, Françoise, prominently placed on his tomb in the Feuillants 
Abbey, Qui que tu sois, qui regardes ce tom beau et qui dem andes m on 
nom , en disant: Est-il m ort Montaigne? Cesse d’être surpris: la 
substance du corps, l’illustration de la naissance […] ce sont seulem ent 
des jouets périssables […] m oi qui ai su allier à la doctrine qui respecte 
le Christ le doute pyrrhonien. […] j’ai été prendre m on rang parm i les 
im m ortels, où est m a patrie (Dosquet and Lamotte 22). 
However, most ironic of all, given Montaigne’s ambivalent 
attitude toward Christian models of a belle m ort, is Estienne Pasquier’s 
letter in which Montaigne fit dire la Messe en sa cham bre; & com m e le 
Prestre estoit sur l’eslevation du Corpus Dom ini, ce pauvre 
Gentilhom m e s’eslance au m oins m al qu’il peut, com m e à corps perdu, 
sur son lict, les m ains joincts: & en ce dernier acte rendit son esprit à 
Dieu. Qui fut un beau m iroir de l’interieur de son Am e (48-9). 
Probably composed in the first years of the new century, revised until 
as late as 1615, and not published until 1619, this scene can only be 
based upon hearsay, third-hand information gleaned from Bernard 
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Automne (Simonin 351), possibly through Florimond de Raymond, 
himself not present either, for Pierre de Brach, also absent, reported 
that Montaigne, astoundingly, had personne pres de luy  à qui il peust 
desployer les dernieres conceptions de son am e (Letter to J uste Lipse 4 
February 1593, reproduced in the Villey-Saulnier edition, 1203). The 
letter speaks more to Pasquier’s own shift in religious self-presentation 
in light of his struggles against the J esuits, and seems a calculated 
effort to impress its addressee, Claude Pellejay, founder of a chair of 
theology, friend of the prominent J esuit at Henri IV’s court, Pierre 
Coton, and a man by all accounts personally obsessed with preparing 
his own “Christian” death (Magnien 281). For Pasquier, this is the way 
Montaigne should have died. Pasquier’s suspect letter nonetheless 
inspired a painting executed in 1853 by J oseph Robert-Fleury (1797-
1890) that still hangs in the Musée du Périgord in Périgueux, Les 
derniers Mom ents de Montaigne, in which the dying writer struggles 
in his night robe to lift himself off the bed toward the chaplain’s 
Eucharist at the moment of the Elevation. This picture figures vividly 
in the mind of the Bishop of Périgueux, come to Montaigne’s chateau in 
1875 to mark a thaw in the dioceses’ relations with its most celebrated 
writer, au m om ent de l’élévation du ‘corpus Dom ini,’ il s’élança sur son 
lit les m ains jointes, et rendit son esprit à Dieu  (Saint-Martin 42). 
Montaigne’s essay traces a very different course, one in which 
what finally issues forth from his “lips” is his book’s self-description in 
its fullest memorial purpose (Hoffmann, “Portrayal”). At the end of the 
essay, he gruesomely maintains the experience of death at the heart of 
his self-portrayal, Je m ’estalle entier: c’est un Skeletos où, d’une veuë, 
les veines, les m uscles, les tendons paroissent, “I expose myself entire: 
my portrait is a cadaver on which the veins, the muscles, and the 
tendons appear” (II, 6, 80 ; 379c; 274). As an expérience inéprouvée, 
death establishes the defining limit of an autobiographical impulse that 
Blanchot terms a “suicide perpetual” (110 , 105). Although Montaigne 
established a link between his project to “paint” himself and the self-
portrait of René of Sicily he observed as it was presented to Francis II in 
1559 at Bar-le-duc (II, 17, 515; 653a; 496), his image of the “skeletos,” 
as J ean Balsamo suggests, alludes to another, far more famous work of 
art that he would have seen in that same town, the sepulchral sculpture 
of René d’Orange, executed by Ligier Richier fifteen years earlier 
(Fréchet 44-5; cf. Nakam 251-3). Montaigne’s term, “skeletos,” signifies 
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neither a skeleton nor a cadaver proper, but a desiccated, mummified 
state that corresponds closely to Richier’s figure, whose dried skin 
hangs in tatters revealing, as in Montaigne’s written self-monument, 
“the veins, the muscles, and the tendons.” Nearly unique in funerary 
art, this standing, gesturing transi suggests a disquieting allegory of 
resurrection, for it presents not a rebirth, but the reanimation of a body 
that remains very much that of a dead man. Despite Scripture’s “O dry 
bones […] I will lay sinews upon you, and will cause flesh to come upon 
you, and cover you with skin” (Ezekiel 37.4-6), Richier’s skeletos points 
not toward life after death, but death after life, or, at best, a living 
death. 
So, too, with Montaigne. The notable absence of his father 
among those concerned over his welfare back at the château, as well as 
the fact that, even while wounded, Montaigne is clearly acting as the 
châtelain responsible for giving orders, all make it highly probable that 
his fall took place during the Third War, sometime then between 23 
August 1568 and 8 August 1570 , in other words, immediately preceding 
the beginning of his literary career with his posthumous edition of La 
Boétie’s writings in preparation for his own attempts at writing the 
Essais (Simonin, “Œuvres complètes”). His recovery from the accident 
might explain why, nearly eight years after inheriting his friend’s 
manuscripts, Montaigne suddenly decided to publish them. 
Henceforth, writing for Montaigne addressed itself to attaining the 
living death of literary posterity. 
If this essay recounts losing one’s consciousness, it nevertheless 
seems to grow more alertly conscious of itself, culminating in the final, 
added pages which Montaigne self-consciously discusses the propriety 
of his self-portrait (Regosin 160-5). On these last pages, “me” and 
“oneself” significantly replace Montaigne’s preceding preference for 
referring to his “soul,” suggesting a collapse of the soul into the self, or 
more precisely, the skeletos, and the abandonment of any ontological 
sense of identity in favor of the instance of self-consciousness—what 
Montaigne jokingly calls m on essence, “my essence” (II, 6, 80 ; 379c; 
274). Although his neighbor, François de Foix, insisted that the soul 
and the self were one, l’am e parle en prem iere personne […] la ou est 
l’am e, soit universele ou l’hum aine, la m esm es est la pensee, “the soul 
speaks in the first person […] where the soul is, there thought is” (346, 
500), Montaigne has ironically separated the two from the essay’s first 
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page with Canius’ vow to see if je pourray  appercevoir quelque 
deslogem ent de l’am e et si elle aura quelque ressentim ent de son 
yssuë, “I shall be able to perceive any dislodgement of the soul, and 
whether it will have any feeling of its departure” (II, 6, 68; 371a; 267; 
emphasis mine). Unable, finally, to expel his soul from his lips, 
Montaigne resigns himself to expressing this self through his mouth, as 
Ullrich Langer (80) perceptively points out in the essay’s last line, Qui 
se connoistra ainsi, qu’il se donne hardim m ent à connoistre par sa 
bouche, “Whoever knows himself thus, let him boldly make himself 
known by his own mouth” (II, 6, 82; 380c; 275). Thus the insubstantial 
“empty air” into which the expiring breath dissipates, according to 
Solomon’s atheists, becomes corps aërée de la voix, “this airy medium” 
of Montaigne’s written voice (II, 6, 80 ; 379c; 274).  
 
*** 
 
Garasse recounted the most blasphemous last testament he had ever 
seen: le prem ier est, de ce vieux atheiste de Poitiers, lequel je ne 
nom m e point par respect, qui ordonna par testam ent, que son corps 
seroit enferm é dans une peau de pourceau conroyée, et ensevely  
debout devant le grand autel de l’eglise, sur une pille de charbons, 
donnant pour raison de son dire, qu’il n’y  avoit point d’autre dieu au 
m onde que l’incorruptibilité du corps, et que les charbons et la peau de 
pourceau bien conroyée, estoient deux suffisans m oyens pour 
em pescher la pourriture (915). Like the Poitiers atheist’s corpse in 
tanned pigskin, Montaigne will preserve himself in the “mummy” of 
the book, bound in vellum hide, this corps solide qui puisse durer 
quelques années ou quelques jours apres m oy , “solid body that may 
last a few years, or a few days, after me” (II, 37, 712; 783a; 595), a 
starkly personal eschatology in face of the living “flesh and bones” of 
the resurrected Christ (Luke 24.39). Richier’s skeletos still holds an 
unrolled parchment, upon which writing—doubtlessly an epitaph—
once figured, anticipating Montaigne’s own writing in death, and of 
death. Thus do human dreams of finding existence after death live on 
within a fragile membrane of dried skin. 
 
George HOFFMANN 
University of Michigan 
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